CIVIL WAR
Why Pickett’s Charge Failed at Gettysburg
Lee’s July 3 assault ran into a prepared Union center, ineffective artillery preparation, and nearly a mile of exposed ground.
Pickett’s Charge was not simply a failed rush at a stone wall. The Confederate assault depended on artillery that did not disable the Union defense and infantry that had to cross open farmland under fire.
On the afternoon of July 3, 1863, about 12,000 Confederate soldiers left Seminary Ridge and advanced toward the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. Their route crossed open ground for roughly three-quarters of a mile to a mile, ending near a low stone wall and a small copse of trees. [1]
The attack became known as Pickett’s Charge, though George E. Pickett commanded only one of its three divisions. The other two were led by J. Johnston Pettigrew and Isaac Trimble. Nine brigades went forward in Robert E. Lee’s attempt to break the Army of the Potomac after Confederate attacks against the Union flanks had failed. [1]
The assault was not undone by one bad decision or one burst of fire. It depended on Confederate artillery weakening the Union position, then on infantry crossing exposed ground quickly enough to exploit that damage. Neither condition held.
A center that was ready
After fighting on July 2 and renewed attacks at Culp’s Hill on the morning of July 3 failed to dislodge the Union army, Lee chose Cemetery Ridge as his next target. He appears to have believed the Union center had been weakened as troops moved to meet attacks on the flanks. Meade anticipated a major attack there, however, and Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps remained in position at the center. [1]
James Longstreet, assigned to direct the assault, had serious doubts about sending infantry across so much open ground against a defended ridge. His correspondence with artillery officer Edward Porter Alexander shows the uncertainty surrounding whether the Confederate guns could prepare the way for the infantry. [2][3]
That question went to the heart of the plan. If the bombardment did not suppress the Union batteries and disrupt the defenders, the infantry would have to cross the field against a position that remained intact.
The artillery preparation fell short
At about 1:00 p.m., around 150 Confederate guns opened fire on Cemetery Ridge. Smoke and the difficulty of judging range limited the artillerymen’s view of their targets. Many rounds passed over the Union front, while Confederate batteries began to run short of ammunition. [5]
Union artillery chief Henry J. Hunt reduced counter-battery fire to conserve ammunition for the infantry attack he expected. The quieter Union guns could suggest to Confederate observers that the Federal artillery had been silenced. But the Union batteries still had ammunition when the Confederate infantry came within range. [1]
The preliminary cannonade therefore did not create a clear opening. It expended Confederate ammunition without removing the artillery and infantry defenses that waited on Cemetery Ridge.
Open ground, broken formations
The Confederate force had no covered approach. It crossed rolling farmland under fire from the Union front and from batteries positioned on Cemetery Hill and Little Round Top. Fire striking from the flanks was especially punishing to troops advancing in dense formations. [1][2]
The Emmitsburg Road created another problem. Its post-and-rail fences forced men to stop, climb, and reform under fire. Units that began in ordered lines became increasingly fragmented as casualties mounted and formations drifted.
Union infantry also struck the advancing Confederates from the flanks. The attackers were not facing a single line at the stone wall; they were trying to hold together while taking fire from several directions. [1][2]
Calling the assault Pickett’s Charge can obscure that larger reality. Pickett’s Virginia division formed one part of a three-division attack whose success depended on the force moving forward together across the same exposed field. [1]
The Angle and the retreat
Some Confederate soldiers reached the Union line. At the Angle, near the Copse of Trees, Lewis A. Armistead led men over the stone wall. It was the farthest advance of the assault, not a lasting breakthrough. Armistead was mortally wounded, Hancock was wounded while directing the defense, and Union reserves helped close the breach. [1][2]
The surviving Confederates had no practical way to bring enough support across the ground they had just crossed. The attack recoiled toward Seminary Ridge. Confederate casualties exceeded half the attacking force; a National Park Service estimate places the losses near 60 percent. [2]
The repulse ended Lee’s offensive in Pennsylvania. Heavy rain kept the armies largely in place on July 4 before Lee began withdrawing toward Virginia. [2]
Why the failure mattered
Pickett’s Charge did not end the Civil War or destroy Lee’s army. It did end the Confederate effort to win a decisive result at Gettysburg. Lee had committed a large infantry force to an assault that required a weakened Union center, effective artillery preparation, and a rapid advance across open terrain. The Union army retained the men, guns, ammunition, and ground needed to stop it.
Later generations often described the Angle as the Confederacy’s “High Water Mark.” The label gave a symbolic meaning to a brief penetration of the Union line, while postwar disputes also shaped public memory of which Confederate units came closest to success. [4]
The battlefield itself offers the plainer explanation: Confederate artillery did not neutralize the defense, the advance had little protection, and the Union center was prepared for the attack Lee ordered.
Frequently Asked Questions
How many Confederate soldiers took part in Pickett’s Charge?
About 12,000 to 12,500 Confederate troops in nine brigades participated. Pickett commanded one of the three attacking divisions, not the entire force. [1]
Why did Union artillery reduce its fire before the charge?
Henry J. Hunt reduced counter-battery fire to conserve ammunition for the infantry attack he expected. When Confederate troops advanced into range, Union guns still had ammunition available. [1]
What was James Longstreet’s role?
Longstreet opposed the assault and expressed doubts about whether artillery could make the infantry advance feasible. Once Lee ordered the attack, Longstreet was responsible for directing it. [2][3]
What were Confederate casualties in the assault?
More than half of the attacking force became casualties. A National Park Service estimate places the losses near 60 percent. [2]
TIMELINE
Key moments
Sources
- Pickett's Charge — American Battlefield Trust
- Charge for Victory or Defeat at Gettysburg — National Park Service
- Letter, Gen. James Longstreet to Col. Edward P. Alexander, 3 July 1863 — Library of Congress
- Pickett's Charge — Encyclopedia Virginia / Virginia Humanities
- E. P. Alexander at Gettysburg — American Battlefield Trust
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