WARS CONFLICT
From Confrontation to Red Square: Reagan, Gorbachev, and the Cold War’s Closing Years
A hard-line buildup, four contentious summits, and a treaty that required nuclear missiles to be destroyed—not merely counted.
Ronald Reagan entered office promising to challenge Soviet power. By the end of his presidency, he and Mikhail Gorbachev had negotiated the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons and changed the working relationship between Washington and Moscow.
In March 1983, Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” in Orlando, Florida. Five years later, at a summit in Moscow, he said the phrase belonged to “another time, another era.” The Cold War had not vanished, and Washington and Moscow did not suddenly trust each other. But the way they managed their rivalry had changed. [1][2]
Reagan’s policy combined military pressure with a willingness to negotiate when an opening appeared. Mikhail Gorbachev, who became leader of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985, provided that opening. Their diplomacy did not by itself end the Cold War; Soviet economic and political problems mattered greatly. But it produced a concrete breakthrough: the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty. [2][3]
The buildup and the “evil empire”
Reagan entered office in January 1981 determined to strengthen the U.S. military position against the Soviet Union. In Europe, a central dispute concerned Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles. The weapons could threaten European targets and became a major source of tension within NATO.
In November 1981, Reagan proposed the “zero option.” The United States would forgo deploying new intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe if the Soviet Union dismantled its SS-20s. The proposal did not immediately produce an agreement, but it set out a clear goal: eliminate the missiles rather than merely limit them. [1][3]
When no agreement emerged, the United States began deploying Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe in late 1983. The deployment formed part of a broader defense buildup and strengthened Washington’s bargaining position in the European missile dispute. [1][3]
That year also supplied two of the best-known examples of Reagan’s hard-line approach. In March, he used the “evil empire” description; later that month, he announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, a program to research ground- and space-based defenses against ballistic missiles. Soviet leaders feared that missile defenses could upset the existing nuclear balance. [1][2]
Pressure alone, however, could not produce an arms-control agreement. That required a Soviet leader ready to reconsider the costs of the arms race.
Four difficult meetings
Gorbachev became Soviet general secretary in March 1985. He inherited serious economic problems and pursued internal reforms. Continuing competition with the United States was costly, giving him reason to seek arms reductions. [1][2]
Reagan and Gorbachev held four major summits between 1985 and 1988: Geneva, Reykjavík, Washington, and Moscow. No single meeting settled the major disputes. Progress came through repeated talks, sharp disagreements, and partial understandings.
At Geneva in November 1985, they met face to face for the first time. The summit did not produce a sweeping arms-control settlement, but it established a working relationship that would matter when negotiations became more difficult. [1][2]
Neither leader simply accepted the other’s terms. Reagan maintained his support for SDI, while Gorbachev resisted U.S. positions. Still, each tested whether the other could make commitments that would withstand skepticism at home and among allies.
Reykjavík’s unfinished bargain
The October 1986 summit in Reykjavík, Iceland, revealed both the scope of possible reductions and the distance still between the two sides. The discussions ranged into ambitious proposals for nuclear cuts, but no agreement was signed because of disagreement over SDI.
Gorbachev sought restrictions that would keep SDI research in laboratories. Reagan refused those limits, and the talks ended without a treaty. [6]
Reykjavík was therefore a disappointment in the moment, but it helped define what could be negotiated next. The impasse over missile defense remained, while talks on intermediate-range missiles moved forward. [1][6]
The INF Treaty: elimination, not a cap
On December 8, 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in Washington. It required the United States and the Soviet Union to destroy their ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Rather than setting a ceiling on those weapons, the treaty eliminated an entire category of land-based missiles. [3]
The agreement addressed weapons that had been at the center of a major NATO-Soviet confrontation earlier in the decade. It also showed that a divisive proposal could become a binding agreement.
The treaty led to the dismantlement and destruction of 2,692 U.S. and Soviet missiles. Its verification provisions were central to the deal: both countries accepted on-site inspections to confirm that missiles, launchers, and related facilities were handled as required. [3][4]
The inspections addressed a basic problem of arms control: each side needed a reliable way to judge whether the other was complying. National intelligence remained important, but the INF system added physical access and procedures negotiated in advance. Its verification measures became an important model for later arms-control agreements. [4]
INF did not end nuclear danger or resolve every dispute between Washington and Moscow. SDI remained contentious, and both nations retained large nuclear arsenals. But the treaty demonstrated that a specific part of the Cold War arms competition could be reversed and checked through inspection.
From Red Square to Governors Island
At the Moscow Summit in May 1988, Reagan walked through Red Square as relations between the two governments had become more workable. Asked about his earlier “evil empire” language, he said it referred to “another time, another era.” [1][2]
The remark did not mean that the Soviet system had become democratic or that U.S.-Soviet differences had disappeared. It reflected changed circumstances: Gorbachev’s reforms, the summit process, and the INF Treaty had altered the immediate relationship.
In December 1988, Reagan, Gorbachev, and President-elect George H. W. Bush met at Governors Island in New York Harbor. The meeting came as Reagan prepared to leave office and Bush prepared to take charge of U.S. policy toward Moscow. [5]
Reagan did not preside over the Soviet Union’s dissolution; it came after his presidency. Nor can the Cold War’s outcome be assigned to one president, one arms program, or one summit. Soviet internal weakness, Gorbachev’s decisions, European politics, and decades of containment all shaped the result. Reagan’s contribution was to combine a forceful military posture with a readiness to negotiate when an opening appeared. The INF Treaty showed both the promise and the limits of that approach: rivalry could yield verifiable reductions without disappearing altogether. [2]
Frequently Asked Questions
What was Reagan’s “zero option”?
Proposed in November 1981, the zero option offered to halt U.S. deployment of new intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe if the Soviet Union removed its SS-20 missiles. It did not initially produce an agreement, but it became the basis for the INF Treaty’s elimination of an entire class of ground-launched weapons. [3]
Why did the Reykjavík Summit break down?
At Reykjavík in October 1986, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed far-reaching nuclear reductions but could not agree on restrictions for SDI research. Gorbachev sought to limit the work to laboratories, while Reagan rejected that condition. The summit ended without a treaty, though its discussions helped shape later progress on intermediate-range missiles. [6]
What made the INF Treaty different from earlier arms-control agreements?
The INF Treaty required destruction rather than a simple limit on a category of missiles. It also included extensive on-site inspection procedures, giving each side a direct way to verify that the other was carrying out its obligations. [3][4]
TIMELINE
Key moments
Sources
- Ronald Reagan: Foreign Affairs — Miller Center, University of Virginia
- Ronald Reagan: Impact and Legacy — Miller Center, University of Virginia
- Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), 1987 — U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian
- The INF Treaty, 1987-2019 — National Security Archive, The George Washington University
- Reagan, Gorbachev and Bush at Governors Island — National Security Archive, The George Washington University
- Reagan and Gorbachev: The Reykjavik Summit — National Museum of Nuclear Science & History
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