PEOPLE POWER
Why Gerald Ford Pardoned Richard Nixon
A month after Nixon resigned, Ford chose to end the prospect of a federal trial—and accepted the political damage that followed.
A month after Nixon resigned, Gerald Ford ended the prospect of a federal trial. The pardon was intended to move the country beyond Watergate, but it left a lasting argument over justice, mercy, and presidential power.
On September 8, 1974, Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon before Nixon had been indicted. The proclamation covered any federal offenses Nixon may have committed between January 20, 1969, and August 9, 1974—the dates of his presidency. It removed the possibility that Watergate would end in a federal criminal trial of the former president. [1][3]
Ford had been in office for just a month. Nixon’s resignation had ended his presidency, but it had not answered whether he might be prosecuted for conduct connected to Watergate. Ford concluded that an indictment and trial could keep the country, the White House, and the courts tied to the scandal for years.
That judgment became one of the defining decisions of Ford’s presidency. He presented the pardon as a way to let the country move on. Many Americans saw it as a decision that spared a powerful man the ordinary demands of the justice system.
Ford’s Case for Ending the Matter
Ford took office on August 9, 1974, the day Nixon resigned. At his first presidential news conference, on August 28, questions about Nixon’s legal exposure dominated the exchange. Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski was assessing possible charges, and Ford was soon provided material outlining a potential case and the prospect of grand-jury action. [1]
Ford believed a prosecution would be long, disruptive, and politically consuming. In his public remarks, he argued that the country could not fully turn to other domestic and foreign concerns while Nixon’s criminal liability remained unresolved. [1]
The decision developed over several weeks. Ford asked White House Counsel Philip Buchen and attorney Benton Becker to examine pardon precedents and the scope of presidential clemency. Ford and Alexander Haig, Nixon’s departing chief of staff, had also discussed transition scenarios before Nixon left office, including the possibility of a pardon. Those contacts helped fuel suspicions of an arrangement, though Ford repeatedly denied making one. [2][5]
Ford’s reasoning was a calculation, not a claim that Nixon had done nothing wrong: a prosecution might provide legal accountability, but Ford believed its cost to the country would be too great.
A Pardon Before Charges
Article II of the Constitution authorizes the president to grant “Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,” except in cases of impeachment. A federal pardon may be issued after an offense has been committed; it does not require an indictment, trial, or conviction. [3]
Ford used that authority in Proclamation 4311, granting Nixon a “full, free, and absolute pardon” for offenses against the United States during his presidency. [1][3]
The timing was central to the controversy. Nixon had not been charged. The pardon foreclosed a federal trial before prosecutors could present evidence and before a jury could reach a verdict.
Ford also looked to *Burdick v. United States*, a 1915 Supreme Court case. The Court wrote that a pardon carries an “imputation of guilt” and that acceptance brings a “confession of it.” Ford took that language to mean Nixon could accept the pardon only with an acknowledged moral burden. [4]
That interpretation remains contested. The language in *Burdick* did not amount to a criminal conviction, and legal scholars have questioned whether it created a binding rule that accepting any pardon is a legal confession. Nixon’s acceptance did not produce what a prosecution could have: sworn testimony, findings tied to particular offenses, or a jury verdict. [4]
A Swift and Costly Backlash
Ford announced the pardon from the Oval Office on a Sunday morning. He asked Americans to weigh the practical consequences of putting Nixon on trial and argued that the country needed to address other pressing problems. [1]
The public response was harsh. Jerald terHorst, Ford’s press secretary and a longtime friend, resigned immediately in protest. [5]
Gallup found broad opposition to the pardon, including substantial support among Republicans for trying Nixon. Ford’s approval rating fell from 71 percent to 50 percent shortly after the announcement. [6]
The pardon later became inseparable from Ford’s political identity. It did not alone determine his 1976 loss to Jimmy Carter; the economy, Ford’s campaign, and Watergate’s wider aftermath also mattered. But the decision intensified a public suspicion that Washington’s most powerful figures could receive protections unavailable to ordinary citizens.
Ford Answers Congress
Critics questioned whether Ford had promised clemency in exchange for Nixon’s resignation. On October 17, 1974, Ford voluntarily appeared under oath before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, chaired by Rep. William L. Hungate. He was the first sitting president to testify before a congressional committee since Abraham Lincoln. [2]
Ford denied a prior agreement with Nixon or Haig and rejected the charge of a “corrupt bargain.” He said he had reached the decision only after taking office, studying the legal question, and considering the effect a prolonged prosecution could have on the country. [2]
The testimony did not erase public skepticism. Private transition discussions had occurred, and the speed of the pardon left many Americans doubtful. But the available record does not establish a bargain. What it does establish is that Ford denied one under oath before Congress. [2]
The Argument That Endured
In 2001, the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Foundation awarded Ford its Profile in Courage Award, recognizing a decision it regarded as politically costly and rooted in concern for national stability. [7]
The award did not resolve the central disagreement. Ford’s defenders argue that Watergate had already strained the country and that a trial of Nixon could have extended the damage. His critics argue that a trial was precisely how the country could have tested whether a former president stood subject to the law.
Ford chose to end the prospect of prosecution. The country avoided the extended Nixon trial he feared, but it also lost the public legal accounting that many Americans believed Watergate required.
That tension still defines the pardon’s significance. Ford treated clemency as a tool of national recovery. His critics saw executive mercy becoming executive exemption.
Frequently Asked Questions
Did Ford and Nixon make a secret deal before Nixon resigned?
Ford consistently denied making a pardon agreement with Nixon or Alexander Haig before Nixon’s resignation. Haig and Ford did discuss transition possibilities, including pardon-related questions, which contributed to suspicion. Ford later testified under oath that no deal had been made, and the available record does not establish a corrupt bargain. [2][5]
Did accepting the pardon legally admit Nixon’s guilt?
Ford relied on *Burdick v. United States*, which described acceptance of a pardon as carrying an imputation and confession of guilt. But that language did not create a criminal conviction, and its legal reach remains debated. Nixon’s acceptance did not establish guilt through a trial or jury verdict. [4]
Why did Jerald terHorst resign?
TerHorst resigned immediately after Ford announced the pardon because he opposed the decision. His departure showed that disagreement over the pardon existed within Ford’s own administration as well as outside it. [5]
TIMELINE
Key moments
Sources
- Remarks on Signing Proclamation Granting Pardon to Richard Nixon — Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library & Museum
- President Gerald R. Ford's Testimony Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice — Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library & Museum / U.S. House of Representatives
- Proclamation 4311—Granting Pardon to Richard Nixon — The American Presidency Project, UC Santa Barbara
- Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915) — Supreme Court of the United States / Justia
- The Pardon — Smithsonian Magazine
- Gallup Vault: A Pardon That Took a Decade to Forgive — Gallup
- The Nixon pardon in constitutional retrospect — National Constitution Center
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